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Abstract.  What is the status of rational choice theory in contemporary European 
political science?  Compared with a quarter-century ago, the rational choice 
approach is still far from being the paradigm of work in the discipline, but 
looking at both anecdotal evidence and information derived from journal 
citations and textbook contents, it seems that the number of political scientists 
working wholly or partly within the public choice approach has grown 
markedly, and that its contribution to the mainstream of the field is strong. 
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thought; paradigms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Is public choice more of a paradigm, a school or a sect in political 
science? 
 
The question is not mine, and it is not new.  It was asked as long ago 
as a quarter of a century—in an article in Scandinavian Political Studies 
written by my former colleague, Danish political science professor 
Peter Nannestad of the University of Aarhus (Nannestad 1993).  
Nannestad’s question was not meant as a hostile one.  He was—and 
is—himself a proponent of the use of rational choice theory in 
political science.  He posed the question about the status of the 
rational choice approach in political science then because he observed 
two not entirely identical situations in the early 1990s. 
But before considering those, we may initially confront a 
terminological issue: In his article, Nannestad used the terms 
“rational choice” and “public choice” more or less interchangeably, 
taking his cue from Dennis Mueller’s well-known formulation, that 
public choice is “simply the application of economics to political science” 
(Nannestad 1993, p. 128; cf. Mueller 2003, p. 1).  I will do more or less 
the same here, i.e., seeing someone as a rational choice theorist, 
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irrespective of his formal field (e.g., economics, political science, 
sociology, law) and no matter what he may call himself, if he in his 
approach to questions subscribes to the triple pillars that James 
Buchanan ( 2003) has described as the “hard core” of public choice: 
(1) methodological individualism; (2) a rational choice principle; (3) 
politics as exchange.  Those three principles are sufficiently general, 
broad and unspecific to be compatible with most of what Bernard 
Grofman in a somewhat different formulation has identified as the 
credo of a ‘reasonable choice’ modeler” (Wuffle 1999).  But this is also 
a somewhat broader concept than what many associate with public 
choice—e.g., in the United States or among many economists 
generally where ‘public choice’ often is linked closely and specifically 
to the Virginia School of Buchanan and Tullock.1  For those using the 
term “public choice” more narrowly, the conclusions made here may 
not ring true to the same extent. 
 
2. North America versus Europe 
 
The difference that Nannestad identified in 1993 was that rational 
choice in political science was seen very differently in North America 
and in Europe. 
In the former rational choice theory had achieved a very influential, 
perhaps even dominant position.  Nannestad noted how Theodore J. 
Lowi (1931-2017) shortly before had concluded in his presidential 
address to the American Political Science Association, that  “public 
choice has become probably the hottest thing going on in political science 
today” (Lowi 1992, p. 4) and achieved the status of one of three 
“hegemonic subdisciplines” of political science (Lowi 1992, p. 1). 
Not long after Nannestad’s article, Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann conducted a survey of the articles contained in A New 
Handbook of Political Science (Goodin and Klingemann 1996a, p. 20), 
which confirmed that rational choice analysis in a few years had 
achieved an extremely prominent position in the discipline: 
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[Political scientists] need a theoretical framework which can 
straddle and integrate all these levels of analysis.  Therein 
arguably lies the great power of rational choice analysis and 
new institutionalism; and that, in turn, may go some way 
toward explaining the predominance of those intellectual 
agendas across contemporary political science as a whole. 
 
They referred to “the rational choice revolution”, which has “been 
remarkably successful, not so much in pushing out the old behavioral 
orthodoxy, as in carving out a predominant role for itself alongside it” 
(Goodin and Klingemann 1996a, p. 24).  Even the strongest critics of 
the approach in the 1990s, such as Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, 
who lambasted the approach’s theoretical and empirical applications, 
acknowledged its great influence on the discipline.2 
The other observation by Nannestad was that this prominence of 
rational choice analysis in US political science did not seem to hold 
for its European counterpart, and to be even less true in Scandinavian 
political science, where it was very far from central or even 
prominent.  In his 1993 article Nannestad quoted British political 
scientist Patrick Dunleavy: 
 
[It] is still very common outside the United States for 
political scientists who do not themselves use public choice 
methodology to dismiss it as of marginal interest for the 
discipline as a whole.…  Public choice theory is widely seen 
by political scientists, as simply another obtuse specialism 
produced by overdeveloping particular techniques without 
putting equal effort into showing how they can add to our 
substantive knowledge about central topics in political life. 
Public choice may be a legitimate field to work in ‘if you like 
that kind of thing’, but it is still not regarded as a basic 
intellectual position which has to be regularly or seriously 
considered in describing the behavior of political systems and 
structures. (Dunleavy 1991, p. 3) 
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Nannestad himself observed when looking at political science in 
Scandinavian countries: 
 
At first sight we find very little, almost nothing … [R]ational 
choice appears to be close to non-existing in these 
[Scandinavian] countries.… As in most of the rest of 
Europe, rational choice theory is far from being as well-
established an approach in Scandinavian political science as 
it appears to be in the United States. (Nannestad 1993, p. 
133) 
 
But digging somewhat deeper and surveying the work actually being 
done by Scandinavian political scientists, Nannestad concluded with 
a bit more nuance: That while the numbers of political scientists 
applying rational choice insights were quite small, the mentality was 
not that of a sect: 
 
[C]ontrary to first impressions, rational choice theory is 
actually used, by some Scandinavian scholars, at least, as 
their theoretical point of departure for attacking a wide range 
of empirical and theoretical problems in political science.  But 
it is also obvious that, taken by sheer numbers, this group is 
a relatively insignificant one.… Unsurprisingly, then, 
rational choice theory cannot claim status as a paradigm in 
Scandinavian political science.  It is not even a serious 
contender for that position.  Rather, it seems to linger at the 
borderline between a school and a sect.  The size of the group 
applying rational choice theory in its work could easily make 
one think of a sect, but in general the group’s attitude seems 
not sectarian: most scholars using rational choice theory 
appear to have a pragmatic, instrumental attitude towards it 
and show little of missionary zeal.  Rational choice theory is 
used because (and when) it is deemed useful.  There are few, 
if any, ‘true believers’, do dogmas are universally adhered to, 
etc.  And, most importantly, the bulk of problems analyzed 
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by Scandinavian political scientists within the rational 
choice framework are mainstream political science problems 
rather than the obscure (to all others) specialism of interest 
to just this one small group. (Nannestad 1993, p. 136f; 
emphasis added) 
 
These observations by Nannestad dealt specifically with 
Scandinavian political science, but my impression is that they 
probably were characteristic of much of European political science in 
general, as it looked in the early 1990s. 
So, what is the situation today?  My contention is that the picture 
of rational choice theory in contemporary European political science, 
compared with about three decades ago, is unchanged on some 
points, but also significantly different on others.  On the one hand, I 
think that we can say with certainty that rational choice theory still is 
not ‘the’ paradigm of European political science.  Not even in those 
subfields where it could be most obvious: Comparative politics and 
the study of national politics, including parties, voter behavior, public 
administration and public policy.  Political science in Europe is and 
continues to be very pluralistic and heterogeneous when it comes to 
approaches, theories and methods, and rational choice theory is only 
one out of many methodologies. 
 But, on the other hand, it is at the same time the case that the 
numbers of European political scientists working wholly or partly 
within a rational choice framework has increased most dramatically 
in recent decades.  While the numbers may once have been what 
Nannestad called “relatively insignificant”, the number of scholars 
conducting research in the rational choice tradition today is far from 
insignificant, and the influence is not waning. 
 In the following, I shall attempt to add observations in support of 
that contention, including examples that I think will illustrate 
differences between the situation at the time of Nannestad’s article 
and today.   
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3. From the 1980s to the 2010s 
 
Let me begin by giving you some almost entirely anecdotal and 
navel-gazing evidence from my own backyard and personal 
experience: Danish political science. 
When I entered university as a first-year undergraduate political 
science student in 1985-1986, the number of political scientists in 
Denmark teaching and actively and explicitly using rational choice 
theory could no doubt be counted on one hand.  At the University of 
Aarhus a couple or fingers or at most three might be enough—at the 
University of Copenhagen even on one finger might be sufficient.3  In 
addition to those professors, several Danish political scientists, who 
certainly were influenced by rational choice analyses, but who 
probably never would have seen themselves as explicit parts of such 
a tradition, could have been included.4  Today, I would say that the 
comparable number of Danish political science faculty members 
doing work that wholly or partly takes its departure in concepts and 
theories of rational choice surely is well into the double digits—
possibly more than a score, depending on exactly whom you count.  
And not only at the two old, large universities (Copenhagen, Aarhus), 
but also including smaller clusters of academics at, e.g., the 
University of Southern Denmark and the Copenhagen Business 
School. 
That growth is visible in various ways.  Since 1999, an annual 
Danish Public Choice Workshop has convened, usually attracting 
somewhere between 15 and 25 participants, drawn from economics 
and political science.5  If you disregard the economists and count only 
the Danish political scientists who have presented papers at these 
workshops over the last two decades you would probably get at least 
25 individuals or so.   
We can also consider Danish connections with our flagship journal, 
Public Choice—which officially is indexed by Thomson’s Web of 
Science as both an economics journal and a political science journal.  
In 1985, no Danish political scientist had ever published in Public 
Choice.  That is radically different now.  In my own department 
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nowadays no less than seven faculty members or younger associates 
have done so—and none of them were around in 1985.  In Aarhus, 
the comparable number is probably about the same.  All in all, at least 
eight “full” professors of political science in Denmark have published 
in the journal over the last decade and a half. 
The trend likewise is visible when it comes to reviewers used by 
Public Choice.  We do not have numbers for the 1980s and 1990s with 
which to compare, but it is probable that only one or two Danish 
political scientists had ever been used as reviewers by the mid-1980s.  
Today, there are 87 academics with addresses in Denmark who are 
registered as authors, reviewers, or both in Public Choice’s Editorial 
Manager system.  Of these 87 individuals, at least 42 are political 
scientists.  Of course, not all of them are rational choice theorists; 
many surely are not, but rather field experts working in different 
traditions.  But the numbers certainly suggest a strong integration of 
Public Choice into the mainstream of Danish political science. 
 Those anecdotal observations can, of course, not automatically be 
generalized to Europe as a whole, but there are reasons to believe that 
the trend has been the same elsewhere.  It is, for example, clear that 
there today are several important clusters of rational choice scholars 
that were not around in, say, 1985.  Institutions such as Trinity 
College (Dublin), the London School of Economics, Nuffield College 
at Oxford University, King’s College in London, the universities of 
Mannheim, Konstanz, Essex and Aarhus today all have either 
significant groups of scholars applying rational choice analysis or 
perhaps even programs where the approach plays an integrated part. 
 But while the number of European political scientists with an 
interest in rational choice has increased, that is not necessarily 
reflected in an equally expanding involvement in ‘capital letter’ 
Public Choice circles.  The younger cousin of this organization (the 
Public Choice Society), the European Public Choice Society, has 
existed since 1972, and is still going very strong.  However, it tends—
much more so than the (US) Public Choice Society—to be dominated 
almost completely by economists,6 and this is probably self-
reinforcing.  Accordingly, and for most of the time, European political 
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scientists seem to prefer to attend their own field conferences, either 
national ones or those of the European Consortium for Political 
Research, the European Political Science Association, or even state-
side conferences (e.g., those of the American Political Science 
Association or the Midwest Political Science Association). 
The former of those organizations, ECPR, has since its inception in 
1970 traditionally been the largest and most important forum for 
European political science; moreover, the same year that Nannestad’s 
article was published (1993), a new so-called standing group of 
members was formed within ECPR dealing specifically with rational 
choice theory.  The group, originally called the Rational Choice 
Politics group, is now named the Standing Group for Analytical 
Politics and Public Choice; as of March 2018, it counts 87 members.7  
The relatively new European Political Science Association (founded 
in 2010) has from its inception had a very strong presence of rational 
choice-inclined political scientists in its leadership.  Currently, the 
latter includes two non-European political scientists, James Alt and 
John Aldrich, whose work in the rational choice tradition is well-
known and influential. 
 
4. Rational choice classics in articles of European political scientists 
 
Let me now turn from the anecdotal to the more general.  One 
possible way of studying the actual “use” of rational choice theory by 
European political scientists could be to see how frequently they cite 
the great works of the relevant intellectual tradition. 
However, it is not an easy thing to do in practice: Even though 
recent decades have witnessed still better, more extensive 
bibliographic databases, it is not necessarily unproblematic to 
identify who exactly should be counted as a European political 
scientist.  Europeans publish in American journals and teach at 
American universities, and vice versa, political scientists publish in 
economists’ journals, and vice versa—and the numbers of co-authors 
continue to go up, along with the number of co-authored articles and 
more and more interbreeding across both frontiers and fields and 
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institutions.  If anything, you could say that the rational choice 
tradition, with its strong interdisciplinary character, has made such 
analysis more difficult! 
For the present purposes I wanted to look at Scopus data with an 
eye to how often the “great classics” in the public choice tradition are 
cited by non-economists from Europe.  So, which ones should be 
included? I wanted to choose a set of giants and initially chose 
Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olson, 
William Riker, William Niskanen and Elinor Ostrom.  Others could 
have been included, but surely those scholars must count as among 
the truly great names.  With the sole exception of Downs, they all also 
have been presidents of the Public Choice Society.  Such a set is also 
highly correlated with the rational choice theorists appearing in 
Goodin and Klingemann’s survey of profiles in A New Handbook of 
Political Science (Goodin and Klingemann 1996b), with a status as 
either “powerhouses” or “highly visible integrators” in political 
science.8  
Rather than looking at all of their works, I wanted to consider only 
their most cited contributions to the literature.9  However, that turned 
out not to be easy given that some books simply are not indexed with 
citation counts by Scopus—among them, rather remarkably, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (Downs 1957) and Bureaucracy and 
Representative Government (Niskanen 1971).  
On the other hand, in a few cases I also admitted some additional 
texts into the list.  In the case of Riker, I included his most cited book, 
The Theory of Political Coalitions (Riker 1962), but also his most cited 
article, with another strong profile, Peter Ordeshook, who has 
defined almost an entirely different subfield of political science (Riker 
and Ordeshook 1968). The same goes for Tullock, who appears both 
with The Calculus of Consent, co-authored with Buchanan, and with 
his own extremely influential article on rent-seeking (Tullock 1967). 
Finally, I thought it would make sense, for purposes of comparison 
and perspective, to include a well-known and much used work in the 
public choice tradition, which is cited a lot (in various incarnations), 
even though it is not in itself a genuine “classic”, namely Dennis 
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Mueller’s literature survey and textbook Public Choice, of which three 
ever more voluminous editions have appeared.  I included the last 
(Mueller 2003). 
 What I did next was to see how often the works were cited by 
authors originating in Europe,10 who are not economists.11  In order 
to see if there have been any changes in how much the works are 
cited, I looked at the last 15 years, split into three five-year periods 
(2003-2007; 2008-2012; 2013-2017).  What we then get is the “picture” 
seen in Table 1.  It is clear that the classics indeed are quite widely 
cited in general, and some of them continue to be very strongly cited 
by European academics, first and foremost Olson’s Logic, but with 
Ostrom also establishing herself as an important modern classic.   
Overall, there seems to be a trend for the classics to hold their 
ground, even 50 to 60 years after the initial publication of some of 
them: They are more cited in the last five-year period than in the first.  
The only work that does not seem to have at least doubled from the 
first to the third period is Mueller’s Public Choice III—a book that is 
different from the others in terms of specifically not being a stand-
alone classic, but rather a more automatically ‘ageing’ work owing to 
its literature-survey character. 
 I should add that a small problem exists that we might be cautious 
of, when making such comparisons over time, namely, that Scopus, 
like other bibliographic databases, tends to accumulate more 
publications over time—and, therefore, that when considering time 
series, one should be conscious of the fact that rising numbers of 
citations for any work may in reality be explained better by more 
sources entering databases over time rather than by increases in the 
work’s popularity as a scholarly reference.  However, when taking 
this time-series property into account we probably are safe to say that 
nothing in the data suggests a decline in interest in rational choice 
classics among European non-economists. 
 
5. Rational choice in contemporary textbooks 
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Another way of considering the topic at hand could be to look at 
political science textbooks and see how well rational choice theory is 
represented in them.  For that purpose, I have surveyed a set of 
popular textbooks from the field of comparative politics, all 
published within the last decade: 
 
• Judith Bara and Mark Pennington (Eds.) (2009). Comparative 
politics: Explaining democratic systems. 
• John S. Dryzek & Patrick Dunleavy (2009). Theories of the 
democratic state. 
• Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair (2011). 
Representative government in modern Europe (5th ed.). 
• Daniele Caramani (Ed.) (2014). Comparative politics (3rd ed.). 
 
What unites the textbooks is that they all originate wholly or 
predominantly in Europe, all are from the last decade, all are from 
respectable publishers, and all are used widely.  Beyond that, 
significant differences emerge.  Some are written as monographs 
(Dryzek & Dunleavy 2009; Gallagher, Laver & Mair 2011), while 
others are multi-author anthologies (Bara and Pennington; 
Caramani).  Some are heavy on empirics and descriptions, while 
relatively light on theory (e.g., Caramani; Gallagher, Laver & Mair); 
others are more or less exactly the opposite (Bara & Pennington 2009; 
Dryzek & Dunleavy 2009). 
What is more important for the present purposes, while they all 
have at least one co-author who is friendlily disposed towards 
rational choice theory, they also have one or more others who are not 
necessarily so.  In other words, they are not as such treatises of 
rational choice theory or systematic applications of it to comparative 
politics (as opposed to, e.g., McLean 1987; Dunleavy 1991; Mueller 
1997; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997; Shughart and Razzolini 2001; 
Mueller 2003; Colomer 2011; Munger and Munger 2015; Holcombe 
2016; Congleton, Grofman and Voigt 2018). 
The overall picture that emerges from an inspection of the 
textbooks with regard to rational choice content is relatively clear.  If 
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the books have theory sections, they always include considerable 
treatments of rational choice theory.  Only as one of several, but not 
simply as en passant treatments. 
Furthermore, if the books contain treatments of the great works of 
modern politics, they include references to virtually all the “classics” 
identified here or their authors more generally.   
All four textbooks also include wide-ranging coverage of the 
contributions to the field of comparative politics by rational choice 
theorists.  There is, however, considerable variation in the relative 
weight given to the “great names” and to later and recent 
contributions.  Finally, three of the four textbooks have extensive 
treatments of core concepts developed in rational choice theory.  The 
fourth (Gallagher, Laver & Mair 2011) does not; however, that 
omission is not because of a lack of attention, but because its focus is 
heavily on empirical studies rather than theory as such. 
Many textbooks in political science and many with a European 
point of departure, geographically or analytically, have been 
published.  A different selection method might have produced more 
or less different pictures.  But it does seem clear that rational choice 
analysis is a very visible force in European political science as it is 
being taught and has gained considerable strength over recent 
decades.  Compare, for example, the four textbooks with, e.g., the 
book Comparative European Politics: The Story of A Profession (Daalder 
1997), which is an anthology with semi-biographical, semi-history-of-
thought essays by the major political scientists at the time, with a few 
prominent US names (Robert Dahl, Sidney Verba and Ted Gurr), with 
the vast majority—quite naturally, given the title—being European.  
The index lists approximately 700-750 names, many with numerous 
references.  Among them are three references to Olson, one to Downs, 
plus solitary mentions of a few others (e.g., Patrick Dunleavy, John 
Ferejohn, Bernard Grofman, Douglas Hibbs)—and none (zero) for 
Buchanan, Tullock, Riker, Niskanen and Ostrom.  Arguably, the 
textbook picture looks remarkably different only 20 years later (see 
Table 2). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
So, what is the takeaway message here?  What is the current status of 
rational choice theory in European political science?  What we have 
considered briefly here is mostly anecdotal or fragmented evidence, 
but let me nonetheless suggest this:   
First of all, rational choice theory is certainly still not “the” 
paradigm of European political science.  It continues to be only one 
out of many competing approaches.  Nannestad’s conclusion on this 
point stands. 
However, Nannestad’s characterization from 1993, at least for 
Scandinavia—that rational choice theorists’ numbers are so 
“relatively insignificant” that they are bordering on a sect—does not 
seem to hold up.  There are grounds for believing that rational choice 
theory never has been more widely accepted in European political 
science than it is now, and that there never have been more political 
scientists working wholly or partly within the tradition.  But not only 
relatively speaking: Rational choice insights also permeate the 
mainstream of European political science, both in terms of the 
influence from “the classics” and in the form of new work being done. 
However, the influence of rational choice has not least been in the 
form of being coopted and integrated in bits and pieces into 
mainstream European political science analysis.  As such it more than 
not is without an explicit, capital letter “Public Choice” or “Rational 
Choice” to it.  There is also very little explicit Virginia, Chicago, 
Bloomington or Rochester heritage to it (cf. Mitchell 1988), and even 
less of an ambition to make public choice identical to the field as such.  
Many of the European political scientists doing rational choice-type 
analyses will as happily cite, say, the “political economists” (e.g., 
Persson and Tabellini 2000, 2003) or may also draw upon, say, 
behavioral analyses, historical institutionalism, or some mix thereof, 
Most would probably call themselves “rational choicers” or “public 
choicers” only rarely, but rather seem happy to simply call 
themselves “political scientists”.  In that respect Nannestad’s 
diagnosis from 1993 seems to hold, too. 
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Table 1. Scopus citations, rational choice classics, European non-economists 
“Classics” and a few others Total number of 
Scopus citations 
(global, all fields, 
etc.) 
“Trend” in number of 
citations in works of 
European non-
economists, five-year 
periods 
Downs: An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (1957) 
N/A N/A 
Buchanan & Tullock: The 
Calculus of Consent (1962) 
2,231 2013-2017: 80  
2008-2012: 93 
2003-2007: 44 
Riker: The Theory of Political 
Coalitions (1962) 
1,360 2013-2017: 94 
2008-2012: 99 
2003-2007: 52 
Olson: The Logic of Collective 
Action (1965) 
10,708 2013-2017: 833  
2008-2012: 658 
2003-2007: 374 
Tullock: “The welfare costs of 
tariffs, monopolies and theft” 
(1967) 
1,227 2013-2017: 37 
2008-2012: 25 
2003-2007: 18 
Riker & Ordeshook: “A theory 
of the calculus of voting” 
(1968) 
1,022 2013-2017: 118  
2008-2012: 77 
2003-2007: 55 
Niskanen: Bureaucracy and 
Representative Government 
(1971) 
N/A N/A 
Ostrom: Governing the 
Commons (1990) 
1,979 2013-2017: 345  
2008-2012: 121 
2003-2007: 58 
Mueller: Public Choice III (2003) 955 2013-2017: 60 
2008-2012: 95 
2003-2007: 43 
 
Table 2. Rational choice in European textbooks in comparative politics 
RC-concepts in index, etc. RC-authors 
Comparative Politics: Explaining Democratic Systems (Bara and Pennington 2009) 
Chicago School of political economy; 
collective goods and collective ac-
tion; methodological individualism; 
paradox of voting; Public choice the-
ory; rational choice theories;  self-in-
terest; veto-players; Virginia school.  
“Classics”: James Buchanan; Anthony Downs; William Niskanen; Mancur Olson; 
William Riker; Gordon Tullock. 
Others: E.g., Gary Becker; Andre Blais; Geoffrey Brennan; James Coleman; Patrick 
Dunleavy; Thrainn Eggertsson; Jon Elster; Russell Hardin; Iain McLean; David 
Mayhew; Mark Lichbach; Douglass North; Todd Sandler; Kenneth Shepsle; Matthew 
Shugart; Ludger Schuknecht; Vito Tanzi; George Tsebelis; Arthur Seldon; Barry 
Weingast; Donald Wittman 
Theories of the Democratic State (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009) 
Collective action problems; indivi-
dualism; median voter; public choice 
theory; rational choice; social choice 
theory; voting cycles 
“Classics”: James Buchanan; Anthony Downs; William Niskanen; Mancur Olson; Elinor 
Ostrom; William Riker; Gordon Tullock  
Others: E.g., Robert Axelrod; Steven Brams; Geoffrey Brennan; Josep Colomer; Patrick 
Dunleavy; Morris Fiorina; Peter Fishburn; Bernard Grofman; Simon Hix; Norman 
Schofield; Kenneth Shepsle; Michael Taylor; Viktor Vanberg 
Representative Government in Modern Europe, 5th ed. (Gallagher, Laver and Mair 2011) 
-- “Classics”: William Niskanen 
Others: E.g., André Blais; Thomas Bräuninger; Josep Colomer; Roger Congleton; Gary 
W. Cox; Christophe Crombez; Marc Debus; Keith Dowding; Patrick Dunleavy; Herbert 
Döring; Jon Elster; Lars Feld; Mark Hallerberg; Simon Hix; John Huber; Thomas König; 
Michael Laver; Arthur Lupia; Iain McLean; David Mayhew; Edward N. Muller; Bjørn 
Erik Rasch; Thomas Saalfeld; Kenneth Shepsle; Matthew Shugart; Gunnar Sjöblom; 
Kaare Strøm; George Tsebelis; Georg Vanberg; Stefan Voigt 
Comparative Politics (3rd ed.) (Caramani 2014) 
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Collective action; collective action 
paradox; median voter; principal-
agent relationship; rational choice; 
rational choice models; vote maximi-
zation 
“Classics”: James M. Buchanan; Anthony Downs; William Niskanen; Mancur Olson; 
Elinor Ostrom; William Riker  
Others: E.g., John Aldrich; Robert Bates; André Blais; Thomas Bräuninger; Josep 
Colomer; Gary W. Cox; Christophe Crombez; Marc Debus; Patrick Dunleavy; Herbert 
Döring; James D. Fearon; Benny Geys; Russell Hardin; Simon Hix; Thomas König; 
Michael Laver; Mark Lichbach; Arthur Lupia; Iain McLean; Lanny Martin; Dennis 
Mueller; Edward Muller; Michael Munger; Samuel Popkin; Thomas Saalfeld; Norman 
Schofield; Kenneth Shepsle; Matthew Shugart; Kaare Strøm; George Tsebelis; Georg 
Vanberg 
 Notes 
1 Against such a narrow use of the term ‘public choice’, see, e.g., Mitchell 1988, 
Riker 1988, Ordeshook 1990; Mitchell 1999. 
2 Cf., e.g., the harsh critics, Green and Shapiro (1994, p. ix), who spoke of “an 
explosion of rational choice scholarship” with “great strides” having “been made in 
the theoretical elaboration of rational actor models.  Formidable analytical challenges 
have attracted a number of first-class minds; rational choice theories have grown in 
complexity and sophistication as a result. Moreover, “[rational choice] is well 
represented in the principal journals and conferences of the discipline, and its 
proponents are highly sought by all major American political science departments.… 
The advent of rational choice theory has recast much of the intellectual landscape in the 
discipline of political science” (Green and Shapiro 1994, p. 2f). 
3 Cf. those identified by Nannestad (1993, pp. 34f): himself, Ole P. Kristensen and 
Gunnar Sjöblom. 
4 Cf. Nannestad’s characterization (1993, pp. 135, 144, note 27) of the works of 
Mogens N. Pedersen and Erik Damgaard. 
5 In this and other connections an influential source, including for political 
scientists, has been Martin Paldam, professor of economics at the University of 
Aarhus and long-time collaborator with several political scientists.  On Paldam, 
the Danish Public Choice Workshop, etc., see Aidt et al. 2013) and Kurrild-
Klitgaard 2015, p. 417). 
6 This conclusion is clearly reflected in the fact that almost every second president 
of the Public Choice Society has been a political scientist (12 of 28, from 1964 
through 2018), while no such scholar ever has held the same position in the 
European Public Choice Society (zero of 29, 1972-2018). 
7 From the standing group’s website (http://standinggroups.ecpr.eu/appc).  The 
group’s self-description: “Analytical politics combines systematic theoretical 
thinking and rigorous empirical testing. One major source of inspiration is the 
literature on collective choice problems, which examines the relationship 
between individual and collective interests. Another line of interest is generated 
by studies that link developments in a formal theory with sound empirical 
research strategy.”  The founding chair (1993-1996) was Josep Colomer. 
8 Mancur Olson, Anthony Downs, Elinor Ostrom and William Riker (pp. 40f).  
Kenneth Shepsle, Barry Weingast and Peter Ordeshook also were included on 
that list, but have been omitted here owing to belonging to a younger 
generation; Buchanan, Tullock and Niskanen were not included by Goodin and 
Klingemann.  For another set of public choice names/works and some citation 
numbers, see Congleton 2018. 
                                           
 21 
                                                                                                                           
9 For a list of “founding books of the public choice movement”, see Grofman’s  ( 
1993) suggestions, which similarly includes Downs 1957, Buchanan and Tullock 
[1962] 2004, and Olson [1965] 1971, but in addition to these also Arrow [1951] 
1963 and Black [1958] 1998.  An expanded “canon” by Grofman also includes, 
inter alia, Riker 1962 and Niskanen 1971 (Grofman 2004). 
10 Europe is defined as west of the Ural Mountains and excluding the Middle East, 
with the exception of Israel. 
11 It is impossible to identify political scientists specifically, so the group includes 
all scholars excluding those from “Economics, Econometrics and Finance” and 
“Business, Management and Accounting”.  In reality, that classification makes 
the group somewhat larger than merely political scientists. 
